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Abstract
This article analyses the changing themes of Vladimir Putin’s populist messaging during his almost 20 years at the apex
of Russian politics. To reveal shifts in Putin’s populist rhetoric, the article examines Russian media framing of his four
presidential-election campaigns and of Russia’s relations with China and the United States (U.S.). Public opinion data is
used to assess the impact of Putin’s populist propaganda. The article begins by assessing to what degree Putin can be
considered a populist politician, concluding that while his rhetoric is populist his rule is largely not. The article further finds
that Putin has maintained his populist appeal by turning his ire from domestic economic elites to international political
enemies, specifically by positioning himself as the main challenger to U.S. hegemony in the global system. Putin’s control
of the Russian media, co-opting of opposition populist causes and geopolitical victories in Syria and Crimea have helped
himmaintain his populist connection with Russian voters. But, the article concludes, growing access to anti-Kremlin online
media, the pain of economic sanctions, botched social welfare reforms, and the presence of effective opposition move-
ments are causing Putin’s populism to lose its lustre.
Keywords
international relations; populism; Russia; Russian media; Russian politics; Vladimir Putin
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Leadership, Populism and Power” edited by Cristine de Clercy (Western University, Canada).
© 2020 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Almost two-decades before Donald Trump, Vladimir
Putin won power in Russia by promising to ‘make Russia
great again.’ A faceless functionary until his surprise ap-
pointment as President Yeltsin’s primeminister in August
1999, Putin used his obscurity to fashion a populist image
as a man of the people. Earthy-toned pledges to ‘wipe
out’ Chechen terrorists, crackdown on unruly oligarchs
and to restore Russia’s international prestige won Putin
the presidency in March 2000. During his first presiden-
tial term, Putin’s jailing and exile of media moguls and
other tycoons helped remove his wealthy political op-
ponents, while cementing his anti-establishment creden-
tials with ordinary Russians (Burrett, 2011).
By the time Putin sought re-election for a third pres-
idential term in 2012, however, he had become a victim
of his own success. After serving at the apex of Russian
politics for 12 years, Putin was undeniably the estab-
lishment candidate. To renew his populist appeal, Putin
turned his anger from domestic economic elites to inter-
national political enemies and their alleged fifth-column
provocateurs, positioning himself as the main challenger
to the Western-dominated global order (Burrett, 2019).
To help Putin reconnect with voters ahead of presidential
elections, the Kremlin also began promoting a new nar-
rative about Russia as Europe’s last bastion of traditional
values, defined as moral conservatism and Orthodox
Christianity (Tolz & Harding, 2015, p. 476). Furthermore,
to counter the emergence of genuine public opposition
protests in 2011–2012, Putin’s government introduced
legislation aimed at reinvigorating Russian citizens’ sense
of patriotism, as well as sanctioning an array of patriotic
organisations targeting Russia’s perceived domestic ene-
mies (Baunov, 2017).
Although Putin has clearly borrowed from the pop-
ulist playbook to win and retain power over the past
20 years, this article argues that he has also es-
chewed many of the tactics deployed by populist lead-
ers in other parts of the world. Putin, for example,
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has largely rejected the anti-immigration, Islamophobic,
ethno-nationalism of many European right-wing pop-
ulists, instead championing Russia’s multi-ethnic charac-
ter as a national strength. Putin’s rhetoric, meanwhile,
frames close relationswith Central Asia, China, and other
rising powers as essential to the country’s great-power
status (Hutchings & Tolz, 2015, p. 27). Unlike populist
presidents Donald Trump or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Putin
has sought to strengthen the state’s institutional founda-
tions and is at pains to appear to be following established
legal procedures, even if in reality he frequently breaks
the rules (Baunov, 2017). Putin’s government maintains
its legitimacy through institutions as well as through pop-
ular public support, aiming to make other state institu-
tions subservient to the presidency rather than to de-
stroy them (Sakwa, 2012).
This article has three parts. The first part analyses to
what extent Vladimir Putin can be described as a pop-
ulist. It compares Putin’s leadership to academic defini-
tions of populism, arguing that while elements of Putin’s
political approach conform to these definitions, in other
ways it contradicts them. The second part of the arti-
cle charts how the themes of Putin’s populist messag-
ing have changed over his four terms as president. To in-
vestigate Putin’s changing rhetoric, the article analyses
the Kremlin-sanctioned narratives promoted by Russian-
state controlled media. Television has played a central
role in disseminating official discourses in Russia since
Putin first became president in 2000 (Burrett, 2011). At
its core, populism is an ideology pitting a virtuous peo-
ple against a corrupt elite (Mudde, 2007). Analysis in
this article therefore focuses on Russian-media framing
of domestic and international elites. Furthermore, since
populist movements generally seek to impose the will
of the people on ‘others,’ the framing of ‘otherness’
by the Russian media is also explored (Morelock, 2018,
p. XIV). The article demonstrates that in light of pub-
lic protests that followed the announcement that Putin
would seek a third presidential term in 2012, official dis-
courses changed substantially. Major shifts included a
change in focus from domestic to international ‘enemies’
and a growing concentration on the West as Russia’s
main other. At the same time, the article finds that me-
dia reporting on China became more positive. These ar-
guments will be elaborated by comparing Russian televi-
sion framing of Putin’s earlier (2000 and 2004) and later
(2012 and 2018) presidential election campaigns. To as-
sess the Russian media’s representation of ‘otherness,’
the article also examines changing coverage of Russia’s
relations with the United States (U.S.) and China over
the course of Putin’s four presidencies. Drawing on me-
dia discourse theory, news reports are analysed qualita-
tively for changes in framing (emphasizing or excluding
specific facts to promote particular definitions and in-
terpretations), narrative, rhetorical strategy, and visual
imagery, all of which can influence the way audiences
interpret events (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine, & Newbold,
1998). The final section of the article analyses the dura-
bility of Putin’s populism. It argues that Putin’s control
of the Russian media, co-opting of opposition populist
causes and geopolitical victories in Syria and Crimea
have helped him maintain his populist connection with
Russian voters, despite presiding over an enduringly klep-
tocratic state. It is further argued, however, that grow-
ing access to anti-Kremlin online media, the pain of eco-
nomic sanctions, botched social welfare reforms, and the
presence of effective opposition movements are caus-
ing Putin’s populism to lose its appeal. The article’s con-
clusion returns to the question of whether Putin can
be classified as a populist, arguing that his leadership
fits most closely with discursive descriptions of populism
and that the Russian president has become less populist
and more nationalist over the course of his long tenure
(de la Torre, 2007).
2. Is Putin a Populist?
The definition of populism is hotly contested among so-
cial scientists. Some scholars use the term exclusively to
describe radical-right ethno-nationalist parties, such as
Fidesz in Hungary, while others also apply the term to
anti-austerity leftist parties, such as Spain’s Podemos or
Syriza in Greece (Ostiguy & Roberts, 2016). Some schol-
ars include social movements as well as political parties
in definitions of populism, for example the Occupy Wall
Street or Tea Party movements in the U.S. (Williamson,
Skocpol, & Coggin, 2011). Nevertheless, most schol-
ars concur that across its diverse manifestations, pop-
ulism expresses a division between ‘the people,’ how-
ever defined, and some type of elite (Mudde & Rovira
Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 8). There is a general consensus that
populists present themselves as the voice of the silent
majority, whose interests are being ignored by the es-
tablishment. Many definitions recognise that populism
does not map onto a conventional left–right axis of polit-
ical competition (Ostiguy & Roberts, 2016, p. 26). Indeed,
populist leaders may draw support simultaneously from
both sides of the left–right spectrum.
From Rodrigo Duterte to Narendra Modi, populism
is often characterised as guided by a strong, charismatic
personality (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 7). Yet not
all manifestations of populism are led by charismatic fig-
ures, as demonstrated by leaderless populistmovements
like the Arab Spring (O’Brien, 2015, p. 337). Furthermore,
when scholars identify a populist leader as ‘charismatic’
this impression is usually based on how leaders present
themselves (as saviours of the people) or how they per-
form (rousing political speeches) rather than on how
their followers perceive them (Albertazzi & McDonnell,
2008, p. 27). Max Weber, who coined the concept of
charisma, however, specified that what is important is
how followers regard their leaders (Weber, 1978, p. 242).
It is not what the leader is, but what the people see the
leader as being that counts in generating the charismatic
relationship.Weber further theorised that particularly at
times of crisis, ‘the people’ would come to see some-
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body as a ‘saviour,’ ascribing to them a charismatic qual-
ity, whether actual or presumed (Weber, 1978, p. 295).
Vladimir Putin first came to national prominence in
Russia in turbulent times. Renewed conflict in Chechnya
in August 1999 prompted President Yeltsin to pro-
mote the little-known Putin—then head of the Security
Council—to prime minister. In this role, Putin capitalised
on the patriotic emotions engendered by the Chechen
conflict. Jingoistic coverage of the war on state-owned
television helped Putin build his public image as a de-
cisive leader (Burrett, 2011). Prior to his appointment
as premier, Putin was a relatively unknown figure out-
side the political elite. When he took office as prime
minister, only two percent of voters identified him as
their choice to replace Yeltsin (Russian Public Opinion
Research Center, 1999). But Putin’s obscurity was an
advantage, allowing him to create his public persona
from scratch. Television coverage showing Putin plan-
ning tough action against Chechen terrorists, inspecting
troops and taking part in martial arts competitions trans-
formed him from a bland security officer into the strong
leader Russians desired. Basing his 2000 presidential
campaign on the ambiguous slogan ‘Great Russia,’ Putin
was able to satisfy the competing interests of diverse do-
mestic constituencies. In the 2000 and 2004 presidential
elections, Putin won by a wide margin, like many pop-
ulists, cutting across left–right cleavages to gain support
from neoliberals, post-Soviet communists and national-
ists alike (Burrett, 2019).
Despite strong xenophobia in Russian public sen-
timents, as far as it is consistent, Putin’s nationalist
rhetoric is relatively moderate. Unlike populist leaders
in many parts of Europe, Putin’s nationalism has mainly
emphasised citizenship rather than ethnic heritage as
the basis for inclusion in a multi-ethnic Russian nation.
Putin’s nationalist rhetoric is largely aimed at controlling
rather than mobilising xenophobic nationalism (Krastev,
2007). This does not preclude, however, the selective de-
ployment of ethnic nationalism for electoral and legit-
imation purposes (Tolz, 2017). In response to the pub-
lic protests that followed his re-election in 2012, Putin
turned to ethno-nationalism to stabilise support for his
administration. Since opinion polls show widespread
xenophobia in Russia, including ethno-racial definitions
of national identity in the official discourses dissemi-
nated by the Russian media allowed Putin to show his
concern for public grievances (Levada Center, 2012). But
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014,
narratives stigmatising Russia’s ethnic or religious mi-
norities were again dropped. Putin could hardly accuse
Ukraine’s new government of ‘fascist’ discrimination
against its Russian diaspora while encouraging ethno-
racial representations of the Russian nation at home
(Tolz, 2017, p. 753).
In appealing to nationalist sentiments, Putin has
sought to mobilise society behind the reestablishment
of order after the economic and political turbulence of
the 1990s (Laruelle, 2009). The state that Putin inherited
from Yeltsin in 2000 was weak and fragmented (Ruble,
Koehn, & Popson, 2001). Regional governors established
personal fiefdoms that overtly rebuffed central author-
ity while several national republics talked of secession.
Russia’s oligarchs plundered the nation’s wealth with lit-
tle respect for the rule of law (Sakwa, 2012, p. 10). By
successfully mobilizing themes that were previously the
reserve of ultra-nationalists and using them to promote
a state-building nationalism that has stabilized Russian
society, Putin is at odds with the majority of populists.
More often, populist leaders show scant regard for in-
stitution building, beyond creating or co-opting political
parties that act as a personal vehicle for winning elec-
tions (Mudde, 2007). In using nationalism to strengthen
the state, Putin has more in common with nineteenth
century state-building nationalists in Britain and Japan
than with many contemporary populists (Hechter, 2001).
Scholars argue that populist leaders establish a par-
ticular type of polity, what Peter Mair has termed ‘pop-
ulist democracy.’ Under this system, charismatic leaders
claiming to embody the ‘will of the people’ reject insti-
tutional constraints on their power (Mair, 2002, p. 90).
In the populist playbook, defying convention and even
breaking the law are celebrated as acts of subversion and
as evidence that the leader will stop at nothing to serve
the people (Fieschi, 2019). Populists thus tend to distain
liberal and deliberative forms of democracy. Moreover,
many populist leaders also undermine electoral forms of
democracy by casting their opponents as illegitimate ac-
tors (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasster, 2014, p. 384). Donald
Trump is a good example of a populist leader prone to
labelling his critics as criminals or fakes. But although
Putin has undoubtedly trampled on democratic norms
and emasculated liberal institution in Russia, he has gone
to great lengths to appear to be following legal proce-
dures (Burrett, 2011). Putin, for example, behaves differ-
ently from many populists by refusing to comment on
court cases involving his political adversaries. Yet at the
same time, in using his influence over Russia’s courts to
harass his opponents, Putin’s actions are more typical of
a populist.
Populists in power invariably seek constitutional re-
visions to strengthen the executive, while weakening
checks and balances (Pappas, 2019, p. 73). Putin has
not radically altered Russia’s constitution, perhaps be-
cause it already granted a dominant role to the president,
who has the right to issue decrees, dissolve parliament
and veto legislation (Huskey, 1999). Russia’s existing con-
stitution gave Putin all the tools he needed to build a
vertical power structure. In 2004, without constitutional
amendments, Putin eliminated direct gubernational elec-
tions, giving himself the power to appoint Russia’s 89 re-
gional leaders. Henceforth, regional governors were cho-
sen based on their loyalty to the Kremlin (Ferris, 2019).
Following demonstrations over alleged parliamentary-
election fraud in 2011, directly-elected regional gover-
nors were reinstated in 2012 (Teague, 2014). When se-
lecting candidates to run for regional governorships,
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Putin has drawn on a new generation of technocrats,
giving them responsibility for delivering his 12 ‘national
projects,’ that include increasing employment, raising
living standards and improving infrastructure. Whereas
Putin formerly drew on his personal network of fellow
former security officers, his recent political appointees
have been chosen for their professional experience. By
promoting a new generation and granting them a degree
of autonomy, Putin is attempting to transform Russia’s
system of governance that is too dependent on him per-
sonally (Hille & Foy, 2018). In building an overly cen-
tralised system predicated on his personal leadership,
Putin’s actions are in line with populists such as Hugo
Chávez or Viktor Orbán (Pappas, 2019, p. 72). But in now
seeking to depersonalise and decentral power—albeit to
a limited degree—Putin’s actions run counter to the pop-
ulist norm (Müller, 2017).
More in keeping with the populist standard, Putin
was behind constitutional amendments that extended
presidential terms from four to six years from 2012.
But in contradiction to this, when his constitutionally
limited two-consecutive terms as president were over
in 2008, Putin did not seek to extend his tenure by
referenda or ad hoc laws like many populists (Pappas,
2019). Rather, Putin took a four-year interlude from
the presidency, serving as prime minister to his pro-
tégé Dmitry Medvedev from 2008–2012. Putin’s moves
vis-à-vis Russia’s constitution both confirm and confound
expectations of populist rule. His decision to take a hia-
tus from the presidencymay have been cosmetic, but ap-
pearances are important. Along with public support, the
appearance of institutionalised procedures is the founda-
tion of his legitimacy (Baunov, 2017).
Although Putin largely seeks to govern through insti-
tutions, his authority over those institutions rests on his
direct, unmediated support from ordinary Russians. In
seeking to connect directly with voters on a personalis-
tic level, Putin follows an approach common among pop-
ulist leaders (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 378).
Although theUnited Russia Partywas created as a vehicle
to support Putin’s legislative agenda in the Russian par-
liament, in three out of four presidential elections he has
stood as an independent rather than on the party ticket.
Again, in common with many populists, Putin
frequently employs crude language and displays of
machismo to showhe is amanof the peoplewhowill pro-
tect the nation (Sperling, 2016). The abundance ofmanly
Putin-images presented by the Russian media are inter-
nationally notorious: bare-chested outdoor man, fighter
pilot and, most theatrically, the tamer of Siberian tigers
(Schuler, 2015, p. 137). The public first heard Putin’s
coarse language in September 1999 when he vowed re-
venge after Russia was hit with several deadly terrorist
bombings. Putin didn’t hold back: ‘We’ll catch them in
the toilet, we will wipe them out in the sh*thouse,’ he
said (Dougherty, 2015). Since then, Putin has regularly
sprinkled his statements with vulgarisms. In response to
a hostile question from a journalist at a Brussels summit
in 2002, Putin bizarrely offered his questioner a circum-
cision. The following year, Putin raised eyebrows again
when he criticised Russia’s oligarchs saying, ‘you must al-
ways obey the law, not just when they’ve got you by the
balls’ (Strauss, 2003).
Putin’s populist gestures have helped him solidify
support among Russian citizens. During his first two pres-
idential terms, his approval ratings averaged approxi-
mately 70 percent (Levada Center, 2019a). But Putin’s
public support is predicated more on the provision of
socially popular measures than on a genuine emotional
connection with voters. Attempts to reform social bene-
fits in 2004 and to raise Russia’s retirement age in 2018
resulted in public protests and a plunge in Putin’s ap-
proval ratings (Myers, 2005; Volkov, 2018). In both cases,
Putin watered down his proposals in response to public
pressure. Unlike populist leaders in other countries who
aim to mobilise and politicise their supporters with what
Conaghan and de la Torre (2008) call a ‘permanent cam-
paign,’ Putin’s governing strategy is based on demobil-
ising and depoliticising Russian citizens (Laruelle, 2013,
p. 4). But demobilisation is not necessarily counter to
populism. Many populist leaders substitute ‘rule by the
people’ with ‘rule for the people,’ with the leader sup-
posedly embodying the people’s will. In this sense, pop-
ulism without participation is not an incoherent proposi-
tion. Populists, such as Silvio Berlusconi or Viktor Orbán,
often adopt a caretaker attitude towards a passive public
(Müller, 2016, p. 30).
Putin’s transactional rather than emotional connec-
tion with his followers suggests only weak evidence of
populism. But populism can be viewed as an ordinal
rather than nominal category. If conceived as nominal,
leaders are either populist or they are not. But if viewed
as ordinal, leaders can be located spatially on a scale,
with some conforming to more elements of populism
than others (Ostiguy, 2017, p. 89). Very few leaders fit
all the attributes of populism as outlined by scholars in
their varied definitions. Putin may not be a populist in
all aspects of his leadership, but this does not mean that
certain populist elements are not part of his repertoire.
As well as viewing populism as ordinal, scholars have
described different varieties of populism. Three main
conceptual approachedhave emerged defining populism
respectively as an ideology, a discursive style and as a
form of political motivation. Cas Mudde’s (2007) influ-
ential ideational approach described populism as a ‘a
thin centred-ideology’ that extols the pure, authentic
people in their confrontation with a corrupt elite. Due
to its generic worldview, Mudde argues, populism can
combine with other more specific ideologies. An alter-
native approach describes populism as a discursive style.
Analysing populism in Latin America, Carlos de la Torre
(2007, p. 389) defines populism as a discourse framing
politics as a struggle between the people and the oli-
garchy. Here, populism is not an ideology, but a mode of
political expression built around a dichotomy between
‘them’ and ‘us.’ In contrast to ideational and discursive
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approaches, some scholars understand populism as a
political strategy. This approach focuses on different as-
pects of political strategy: policy choices, political organi-
zations, and forms of public mobilisation (Madrid, 2008).
This article argues that Vladimir Putin conforms most
closely to discursive descriptions of populism. As out-
lined above, Putin’s rhetoric is often populist, but his
style of governance is largely not. It is further argued that
over time, Putin has shifted frompopulist tomore nation-
alist discourses. The section that follows analyses how
the focus of Putin’s rhetorical appeals has changed over
the course of his four presidential terms.
3. How Has Putin’s Populist Messaging Changed?
3.1. From the Oligarchs to Overseas Enemies
In his campaigns for the Russian presidency in 2000 and
2004, Putin emphasised his firmness in standing up to
forces undermining Russia’s stability, dignity, and hon-
our (Lambroschini, 2000). In 2000, foremost in Putin’s
sights were separatists in Chechnya. Yet despite being
chosen by Yeltsin and his band of oligarchs as a loyal suc-
cessor who would preserve crony capitalism and keep
them out of jail, Putin also turned his ire on those who
had accumulated billions by appropriating state assets.
In the aftermath of the 1998 Russian financial crisis that
saw living standards plummet, the oligarchs, who had
accumulated vast wealth by seizing Russia’s rich natural
resources, were an easy populist target. At a meeting
with the oligarchs a month before the March 2000 presi-
dential election, Putin made it clear that under his lead-
ership the rules of the game would change (Goldman,
2004, p. 36). In his statement—widely reported in the
Russian media—Putin told Russia’s tycoons that they
would no longer be able to flout government regulations
or to count on special access to the Kremlin. Putin re-
iterated the same message in an open letter to voters
published in three national newspapers on 25 February
2000, writing:
Our priority is to protect the market against illegal in-
vasion, both by government bureaucrats and by crimi-
nals….All economic entities should be in an equal play-
ing field. (Putin, 2000a)
The acting president argued that individuals taking ex-
cessive and illegal rents out of the economy ‘threaten
our very existence’ (Putin, 2000a). Putin’s attacks on the
oligarchs won him supporters among ordinary Russians’
struggling tomake endsmeet, aswell as among the coun-
try’s young entrepreneurs, angry that the growth of their
companies was being undermined by the lawlessness of
Russia’s business climate and its dominance by financial
tycoons close to Yeltsin (Thornhill, 2000). As the election
drew closer, Putin’s attacks against the oligarchs became
more explicit. In an interview on Radio Mayak a week
before voting, Putin attacked the oligarchs for ‘merging
power with capital’ and spoke of his aspiration to ‘liqui-
date the oligarchs as a class’ (Reddaway, 2001, p. 27). As
well as condemning the oligarchs collectively, Putin took
aim at individual tycoons. In February 2000, he criticised
Unified Energy Systems chief executive Anatoly Chubais
for presiding over ‘an unstable and disorderly mecha-
nism’ that would not need to hike electricity prices if the
company was better run (Humphreys & Bivens, 2000).
During the 2000 election campaign, Putin had to
tread carefully against the oligarchs, especially those
such as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky whose
media holdings were essential in helping him win
(Burrett, 2011). But his own meteoric rise taught Putin
the power of the media over public opinion. And after
his election, the new president concluded that such a
powerful tool could not be left in the hands of unruly
tycoons. Legal loopholes and their murky financial deal-
ings provided Putin with levers to wrestle their media as-
sets away from the oligarchs. Less than six months after
his election victory, prosecutions were launched against
Berezovsky and Gusinsky, forcing both into exile (Burrett,
2011). Thesemoves allowedPutin to extend state control
over the media, but also to burnish his anti-elite creden-
tials with ordinary Russians.
At the same time as pursuing their oligarchic bosses,
Putin also launched an attack against Russia’s liberal me-
dia elites. Although journalists working for Berezovsky
and Gusinsky helped to get Putin elected, they soon
turned on the new president over his inept response to
the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in August
2000. In an interview on state-owned broadcaster
Rossiya, Putin blamed the media for enflaming public
passions over the Kursk disaster, stating that:
The people on television, who for ten years were de-
stroying the army and the navy, where people are
now dying, are the first among the army’s defend-
ers….Theywant to show themilitary and political lead-
ership that we need them, that we are on their hook.
(Putin, 2000b)
Media coverage criticising Putin over the Kursk disaster
and Chechen war was branded as unpatriotic by his ad-
ministration (Burrett, 2011). But in his propaganda war
with Russia’s media elites, Putin was the victor. Only four
percent of Russians saw his moves to bring Gusinsky and
Berezovsky’s media holdings under state influence as a
clampdown on free speech. Rivalries between oligarchic
clans or economic concerns were more widely accepted
explanations (Petrova, 2001).
Putin’s war with the oligarchs was a central theme of
his re-election campaign in 2004. A public opinion survey
less than a year before the election found that 84 percent
of Russians believed the oligarchs acquired their wealth
illegitimately (Naryshkina, 2004). Themajority of Russian
voters viewed the social and economic influence ofmajor
capitalists as negative (Petrova, 2003). To marshal votes
for Putin, a high-profile target was needed to demon-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 193–205 197
strate the sincerity of the president’s commitment to
ending the parasitic relationship between the oligarchs
and the state. Mikhail Khodorkovsky, owner of the oil gi-
ant Yukos and one of Russia’s most successful business-
men, became the obvious choice when he appeared on
television accusing Putin of improprieties over the sale
of another energy firm Severnaya Neft to state-owned
Rosneft. Around the same time, Khodorkovsky signalled
his intentions to enter the political arena by donating to
Putin’s rivals and buying newspaperMoskovskie Novosti
(Latynina, 2003). His deep pockets made Khodokovsky
a dangerous adversary. In July 2003, Khodorkovsky’s
deputy Planton Lebedev—along with several other high-
ranking Yukos employees—was arrested for embezzle-
ment. On 25 October, Khodorkovsky himself was ar-
rested at Novosibirsk airport and charged with fraud
and tax evasion amounting to billions of dollars. The
nature of Khodorkovsky’s arrest was deliberately ex-
ecuted to create a television sensation that would
elicit maximum support for the move among ordinary
Russians. Khodorkovsky could easily have been arrested
in Moscow, but the storming of his private plane gave
events a filmic quality and provided footage that would
remind audiences of his connection to the privatisation
bonanza of the 1990s.
An aggressive campaign on state television was used
to frame public thinking about Khodorkovsky. Exploiting
voters’ long-held distrust of the rich, state television por-
trayed Khodorkovsky as an oligarch who had reached
the pinnacle of his wealth through suspicious means
(Tavernise, 2003). Putin appeared on television to de-
fend the arrest as purely an attack on corruption. No
other interpretation of events was heard on state-owned
channels, with journalists covering the story without
analysis and likening the affair to the arrest of Enron
executives in the U.S. (Burrett, 2011). A public opin-
ion poll conducted at the end of October 2003 found
that 52 percent of Russians accepted Putin’s explana-
tion that Khodorkovsky had been arrested solely for vi-
olating the law—only 11 percent thought the arrest was
politically motivated (Smirnov, 2003). Khodorkovsky’s ar-
rest allowed Putin to satisfy public demands for action
against the oligarchs while also removing a potentially
dangerous political opponent.
Khodorkovsky’s fate served to deter other oligarchs
tempted to meddle in politics. After neutering the old
cadre and consolidating his power during his first two
terms in office, the biggest obstacle to Putin’s return to
the presidency for a third term in 2012 was voter ap-
athy. A high turnout was crucial to legitimating his re-
newed mandate. But after more than a decade at the
top and a record of throwing his political opponents in
jail, Putin could hardly campaign as a plucky outsider bat-
tling an entrenched elite. To suggest the oligarchs were
still plundering Russia’s wealth would be to admit fail-
ure. To rally populist support for Putin in 2012, there-
fore, the Kremlin shifted its main focus to a different ‘en-
emy’: domestic and international forces bent on over-
turning Putin’s legacy. State-controlled television was
used to vilify those who staged public demonstrations
against Putin’s return. Putin labelled his domestic detrac-
tors as a privileged elite. Russia’s best-educated citizens
were portrayed as traitors, perhaps in the pay of the U.S.
(Krastev & Holmes, 2012, p. 44). This was not the first
time that Putin had invoked anti-Americanismor the idea
of a ‘fifth column.’ During the 2005 Orange Revolution,
Putin accused the U.S. of funding anti-government NGOs
in Ukraine. He did not, however, accuse Western gov-
ernments of the same provocateur activities in Russia
until 2012, when his government introduced legislation
requiring all NGOs receiving overseas funding to regis-
ter as foreign agents (Elder, 2013). In February 2007,
Putin made a powerful speech at the Munich Security
Conference accusing Washington of ‘forcing its will on
the world’ and of undermining global security (Yasmann,
2007). But although there are examples of Putin citing
external enemies earlier in his presidency, it is not un-
til 2012 that this became a consistent feature of his
rhetoric. The subsequent Ukraine crisis from February
2014 gave Putin the perfect opportunity to further so-
lidify nationalist and anti-Western sentiments as the
main base of support for his leadership. In a speech
in January 2015, for example, Putin asserted that pro-
Russian separatists in Eastern Ukrainewere not just fight-
ing the Ukrainian army but also a NATO-sponsored ‘for-
eign legion’ (Sperling, 2016, p. 17). Putin’s Ukraine strat-
egy worked as intended. Thanks to his role as the em-
bodiment of an internationally resurgent Russia, Putin
managed to improve his popularity during one of the
worst economic crises in recent Russian history. Despite
Western-led sanctions that sent Russia’s economy into re-
cession in 2014, Putin’s approval rating hovered around
80 percent (Levada Center, 2019a).
The spectre of a hostile West was again deployed to
bolster support for Putin ahead of the 2018 presiden-
tial election. Russian television warned voters that high
turnout was the only thing protecting the nation from
annihilation by the West. Social media spread rumours
ofWestern government plans to interfere in the election,
while state news agencies alleged thatmore than a dozen
countries had attempted cyber-attacks against Russia
(Polyankova, 2018). Putin’s 2018 presidential rivals were
accused of being agents of foreign powers. State media
accused communist candidate Pavel Grudinin of stashing
$1 million in a Swiss bank account. The Russian parlia-
ment accused those campaigning for an election boycott
of receiving funds from foreign governments (‘V Sovfede
Zayavili,’ 2018).
The Russian media further framed the assassination
attempt against exiled former Glavnoe Razvedyvatel’noe
Upravelnie (GRU) intelligence officer Sergei Skripal on
4March 2018 to support Putin’s narrative of a hostile en-
emy at the gates. The British government was accused
of using the Skripal’ case to spread anti-Russian propa-
ganda to shore up its security partnerships ahead of its
departure from the EU. Speaking on Russian television
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Pervyy Kanal, political scientist Caroline Galacteros ac-
cused the British government of using an attack on its
soil to ‘return the UK to the European family’ (‘Odnim
iz punktov,’ 2018). Speaking on his weekly Vesti Nedeli
programme, Dmitry Kiselyov accused the U.S. of plotting
the attack to undermine support for Russia’s position in
Syria (Kiselyov, 2018). In stoking voters’ fear and resent-
ment towards hostileWestern powers, the Kremlin’s pro-
paganda machine achieved its desired results. Turnout
in the 2018 election reached a respectable 67.5 per-
cent, with Putin winning 76 percent of votes cast. After
the results were announced, Kremlin sources thanked
Western leaders for consolidating support behind Putin
with their threats. Putin’s campaign spokesman Andrei
Kondrashov specifically thanked the UK for ensuring ‘a
level of turnout we weren’t hoping to achieve by our-
selves’ (MacFarquhar, 2018).
Shifting the focus of his discourse from domestic to
foreign enemies does not mean that Putin has aban-
doned populism. Benjamin de Cleen (2017) demon-
strates that nationalism is often articulated within pop-
ulist politics. Nationalism is a discourse constructed
around the nation, which is imagined as a limited,
sovereign community tied to a certain territory and
constructed through opposition to its ‘out’ groups
(Anderson, 1983). Nationalism and populism combine
in numerous discursive ways. One combination pits the
virtuous people, equated with the nation, against for-
eign powers and/ormultinational institutions that would
limit their sovereignty (de Cleen, 2017, p. 353). A good
example is the Brexit Party, which claims to be fight-
ing to repatriate popular-national sovereignty from the
EU. Putin articulates a similar populist-nationalism that
posits the Russian nation as an underdog fighting hege-
monic Western powers accused of undermining Russia’s
national identity and pride.
3.2. From China to the U.S. as Russia’s ‘Other’
Populists’ use of ‘otherness’ to generate support for their
leadership is well documented (Mudde, 2007; Ostiguy &
Roberts, 2016). In the case of Russia, the international
‘others’ against which the nation has been defined and
set in opposition has shifted from East to West during
Putin’s tenure. Given its location between Europe and
Asia, for centuries Russian political leaders and intellec-
tuals have debated different visions of Russia’s others.
Whether or not Russia is part of European civilization
is an argument featuring prominently in these debates
since tsarist times (Neumann, 1998, p. 167). Starting
with Peter the Great, some Russian elites have at-
tempted to define national identity in linewith European
ideas of enlightenment, constitutionalism, and capital-
ism. Integration with Europe and imitation of its institu-
tions has been seen by Russia’s Westernisers as a path
to development (Neumann, 1998, p. 164). In contrast to
these would-be-Westernisers, Slavophiles have concep-
tualised Russia as a unique culture, seeing Europe as a
significant other against which Russian civilisation is de-
fined. Both early Slavophiles and Westernisers tended
to see Eastern civilisations as barbaric and inferior. But
following Russia’s humiliation in the Crimean War, some
Slavophiles turned towards Asia, praising China’s strong
state model and India’s religiosity (Tsygankov, 2008,
p. 767). Slavophile intellectuals began to argue that
only by preserving Russia’s distinct culture—based on
the moral force of orthodoxy and a strong state—could
the nation avoid the decadence weakening Europe. In
the twentieth century, Bolshevik doctrine similarly per-
ceived Soviet Russia as superior to the ‘rotten’ capitalist
West. Civilisational debates reignitedwith the collapse of
the Soviet Union. President Yeltsin’s vision of integration
with the West assumed Russia would develop Western-
style liberal democratic institutions. Yeltsin was opposed
by Eurasianists, with roots in the Slavophile tradition,
who emphasised Russia’s strong ties to Asia and the
importance of cultural and geopolitical independence
(Tsygankov, 2008, p. 768). On assuming office, Putin em-
braced a vision of Russia as part of Europe (Putin, 2005).
But as Russia’s path of development and geopolitical in-
terests have diverged from the West, Putin has pivoted
East. Putin has become increasingly critical of many of
the West’s characteristics, including equal rights for sex-
ual minorities (Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015). Putin
frequently challenges the idea that Western values are
universal (Tsygankov, 2008, p. 771). Rather, he maintains
that Russia’s need for modernisation necessitates an em-
phasis on political stability and national sovereignty over
other values, thus articulating similar civilizational argu-
ments to leaders in China and other Asian states.
When Putin took office in 2000, Russia’s media pre-
sented China as both an internal and external threat
to Russian security. At that time, media reporting on
China mainly focused on illegal Chinese immigration as
a territorial, economic and cultural danger to Russia’s
declining population. The media fanned fears that ille-
gal Chinese immigrants were the first wave of China’s
expansion into Russia’s Far East (Hille, 2016). Similarly,
Chinese traders in Moscow’s markets were accused of
undermining local businesses by trading in counterfeit
goods (Hutchings & Tolz, 2015). But for the past decade,
as Russia’s economic interdependencewith China has ac-
celerated, the Russian media has emphasized coopera-
tion between Beijing and Moscow, playing down areas
of discord.
Russian television builds a narrative of friendship
between China and Russia with frequent references to
bilateral summits, joint economic projects, cultural ex-
changes, and to united action within international in-
stitutions such as the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC)—often to counter what is presented as the de-
structive dominance of the U.S. In recent months, for
example, Russian television has reported on joint ef-
forts to tackle transnational terrorism (‘Bor’ba s terror-
izmom,’ 2019); booming bilateral trade that in 2019 ex-
ceeded $100 billion (‘Vladimir Putin held Kremlin talks
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with Xi Jinping,’ 2019); and Chinese military participa-
tion in Russian-led war games (‘Vladimir Putin pribyl,’
2019). China’s support for Russia at the UN during a de-
bate on Syria also featured prominently on Russian tele-
vision news (‘Na zasedanii Sovbeza,’ 2019). The media’s
reframing of Sino-Russian relations appears to have in-
fluenced Russian public opinion of China. A 2006 survey
found that 41 percent of Russians thought China was a
threat to Russia’s interests, while 36 percent believed it
was not a threat. But by 2014, only 19 percent saw China
as a threat, while a majority 57 percent felt the opposite
(Public Opinion Foundation [POF], 2014). In a June 2017
survey, 62 percent of Russians named China as Russia’s
closest ally (POF, 2017).
As framing of China has become more positive,
Russian media reporting on the U.S. has followed the
opposite trajectory. Media framing of the U.S. during
Putin’s presidency can be divided into several phases.
Putin came to office believing Russia’s international sta-
tus would be best enhanced through integration with
the West. To pursue his strategy, Putin successfully
wooed U.S. President George W. Bush, who famously
claimed to have looked into his Russian counterpart’s
soul and found him straightforward and trustworthy
(Perlez, 2001). The Russian media used his relation-
ship with Bush to herald Putin’s growing global stature
(‘Tretiy den’ itogi’, 2001). The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq,
however, soured Putin’s budding bromance with Bush
(‘Gunitsky & Tsygankov,’ 2018). Russia’s media no longer
presented the U.S. president as a potential partner, but
as an aggressive militarist with scant regard for interna-
tional law or national sovereignty (‘Dzhordzh Bush i Toni
Bler,’ 2005).
Although from the beginning of the Iraqwar onwards,
Russia’s media often took a hostile view of Washington’s
actions—for example, the deployment of American mis-
siles in Poland in 2008—the majority of reporting on
the U.S. was surprisingly matter-of-fact (‘Pol’sha gotova,’
2008). Negative framing of the U.S. ebbed and flowed as
the context of bilateral relations was shaped by events
(Tsygankov, 2010). Anti-U.S. rhetoric only became a per-
sistent feature of Russian news after Washington led ef-
forts to sanction Russia over its annexation of Crimea
in March 2014 (Tolz & Teper, 2018). Events in Ukraine
were systematically framed as a Washington plot to
prevent Russia from taking its rightful place on the
world stage (Kiselyov, 2014). Since then, U.S.–Russia re-
lations have been framed as an existential battle for
survival (Gaufman, 2017, p. 3). Personal attacks against
President Obama and other prominent U.S. policymak-
ers also became more common in Russia’s media from
2014. In some quarters, anti-Obama propaganda in-
cluded racist slurs, conduct not usually seen outside
wartime (Dobriansky, 2016). Anti-U.S. narratives in the
Russian media appear to have influenced Russian public
attitudes. In June 2012, 53 percent of Russians saw bilat-
eral relations with the U.S. as good, while only 17 per-
cent thought they were bad. In June 2014, 64 percent
described the relationship as bad, while just 25 percent
said it was good (POF, 2018). By mid-2014 the U.S. was
seen as the least friendly country towards Russia, even
more hostile than Ukraine (POF, 2017).
It was in the context of deteriorating U.S.–Russian re-
lations that Donald Trump emerged as the Republican
presidential candidate in 2016. Trump’s campaign
rhetoric echoed many of the Kremlin’s criticisms of
Obama’s policies. This, alongwith his praise for President
Putin, guaranteed Trump frequent favourable coverage
on Russian television. Trump’s surprise victory, however,
presented a conundrum for Russia’s media. Coverage of
the president-elect immediately became more negative,
as Kremlin spin-doctors tried to lower high expectations
of the improved bilateral relations that they had encour-
aged during the campaign. Russian television began to
cover anti-Trump protests that it had previously ignored.
Attention also focused on Trump’s business failures, polit-
ical inexperience and sexism, all downplayed during the
campaign (Burrett, 2018). Trump’s intention to ‘get along
with Russia,’ stated during the presidential debates, was
always going to be tempered by his pledges to uphold
U.S. military and economic supremacy (Sakwa, 2017).
In April 2018, for example, U.S. airstrikes on Damascus,
in response to chemical attacks by forces loyal to the
Syrian government, were widely condemned on Russian
television. In a two-hour special broadcast of Rossiya’s
60 Minutes, the U.S. and its allies were accused of faking
news of the chemical attack (Lowe, 2018).
The Russian media’s intensifying onslaught against
the U.S. is motivated by Putin’s domestic political needs
as well as by tensions with Washington over Ukraine,
Syria, and other issues. Anti-U.S. populism is an impor-
tant component of Putin’s efforts to mobilize domestic
support for his leadership against a backdrop of eco-
nomic crisis caused by Western sanctions and rampant
domestic corruption. In these precarious circumstances,
Putin has based his appeal on promises to vanquish
Russia’s foreign foes, chief among them, the U.S.
4. Is Putin’s Populism Durable?
Soon after winning a fourth presidential term in March
2018, Putin’s popularity began to decline. For four years
following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014,
Putin’s approval rating averaged above 80 percent. But
for the past two years, it has hovered closer to 65 per-
cent (Levada Center, 2019a).Moreworryingly for Putin, a
2017 survey found thatmore than two-thirds of Russians
held him entirely or significantly responsible for high lev-
els of corruption among state officials (Levada Center,
2017). Putin’s long tenure at the top is eroding his abil-
ity to brand himself a populist. Russians are growing
tired of his nationalist populism and overseas adventur-
ism. Initially, Putin’s annexation of Crimea boosted ap-
proval of his leadership, as for the first time since the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union, Russians felt like they were a
superpower again (Volkov, 2015). Although the Russian
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media dutifully fed these feelings of national grandeur,
over time, the ‘Crimea effect’ on Putin’s support levels
has waned. Domestic issues are the main concerns of
the majority of Russians, who would like Putin to fo-
cus more of his attention on problems at home than
on wars abroad (Levada Center, 2018a). The Russian
government’s 2018 plan to reform pensions was almost
universally opposed, sparking protests in cities across
Russia. In August 2019, Moscow witnessed its largest
anti-government protests in more than six years, in re-
sponse to a ban on many opposition candidates from
running in city council elections (Roth, 2019). Almost
half of Russians believed that the ban occurred because
Putin’s government was afraid to face an open competi-
tion. Only 25 percent accepted the president’s national-
ist line that Western interference was the main cause of
the protests (Levada Center, 2019b). In the event, pro-
government candidates suffered heavy election losses,
seeing their share of seats on the 45-member council
slashed from 40 to 25 (Bennetts, 2019).
Putin’s preferred candidates were the victims of a
well-orchestrated online campaign encouraging tactical
voting by opposition leader and anti-corruption crusader
Alexei Navalny, who was one of those barred from stand-
ing for election. In exposing corruption within the state
bureaucracy, Navalny is playing Putin at his own game,
basing his appeal on populist issues that matter to or-
dinary Russians (Pertsev, 2017). And Navalny is not the
only populist figure seeking to claim Putin’s mantle. In
2018, Russia’s Communist Party elected a new charis-
matic leader, businessman Pavel Grudinin. Grudinin is a
popular Internet personality, where his videos promis-
ing an end to corruption and a better life for ordinary
Russians regularly draw 800,000 views (Pertsev, 2018).
As Putin’s populist messages become increasingly old
and tarnished, the availability of new populist alterna-
tives like Grudinin and Navalny may further syphon sup-
port from the president.
Putin’s tight control of the Russian media has helped
him retain his populist image, despite his many years in
power. But growing Internet penetration in Russia pro-
vides citizens with access to alternative information to
that presented by state-controlled television, still the pre-
ferred news source for the majority of Russians (Levada
Center, 2018b). As of 2018, 80.6 percent of Russians had
Internet access (Internet Live Stats, 2019). Those taking
part or supporting the 2019 Moscow election protests
weremore likely to get their news online than fromother
sources (Levada Center, 2019b). As he loses control over
the information environment, Putin is also losing his abil-
ity to control his image and the public agenda.
5. Conclusion
This article has argued that although there are populist
elements to Vladimir Putin’s approach to mobilising sup-
port for his leadership, to define him purely as a pop-
ulist is not entirely accurate. Putin is more populist in
his rhetoric than in his ideology or style of governance,
conforming most closely to discursive definitions of pop-
ulism. As his presidency has progressed, Putin’s populist
discourse has developed increasingly nationalist over-
tones. Today, 20 years after he first became president,
Putin’s nationalist-populist narratives aim to maintain a
narrow, vertical power structure that discourages public
participation in politics. Although Putin came to power
by neutralising the influence of Yeltsin-era oligarchs, a
new breed of politically-connected tycoons have taken
their place (Foy, 2019). In 2020, Russia’s kleptocracy is
alive and well. A dwindling number of Russians now see
Putin in populist terms as the people’s champion against
a corrupt elite. Putin’s relationship with Russian voters is
more transactional than emotional, as seen by the rapid
evaporation of support for the president when his ad-
ministration sought to introduce unpopular social wel-
fare reforms. Voters were willing to overlook the incon-
sistencies between Putin’s populist rhetoric and elite-
based rule while the economy boomed, and his policies
restored domestic stability and international prestige.
But the arrival of tech savvy alternatives to Putin, with
their own populist messages more suited to the times, is
eroding support for the president. State-controlled tele-
vision, which maintains Putin’s heroic ‘man of the peo-
ple’ image, is losing audiences to online news. Growing
internet access aided the campaign for tactical voting
against Putin’s preferred candidates in Moscow coun-
cil elections in September 2019. In the past, Putin suc-
ceeded in reinventing his populism by refocusing public
anger from domestic economic to international political
elites, especially towards the hegemonic influence of the
U.S. But today, a growing number of Russians see Putin’s
foreign policy as an obstacle to Russia’s development.
Western sanctions over Crimea and the ongoing war in
Eastern Ukraine are adversely affecting the economy.
After more than five years of sanctions, money is tight.
The Kremlin can no longer keep voters on board with
cheapmortgages, wage rises, and public sector spending.
Under these conditions it is unlikely that disseminating
the same anti-U.S. nationalist populism will help Putin
recover support. Putin is now the establishment figure
against which other Russian nationalist populists make
their claims. Endemic corruption and economic inequal-
ity fuel Russians’ appetite for populist leadership. If Putin
isn’t able to satisfy populist demands, Russian voters will
increasingly turn to others claiming they can.
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